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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1973 to 1985, comprehensive general liability (CGL) insur-
ance policies contained a pollution exclusion clause.' The plethora of
litigation 2 spawned by this clause, however, has done little to clarify
either its meaning or its relationship to the policy as a whole.' Uncer-
1. See generally Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of
the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 610 (1990).
2. A partial list of cases construing the CGL pollution exclusion clause includes: City of
Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988); Benedictine Sisters v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1987); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp.
71 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa.
1986); National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo. 1986); Payne v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1985); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Autotronic Sys., Inc. v.
Aetna Life & Casualty, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins.
Co., 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 427 N.E.2d 1191 (N.Y. 1981); Evans v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 435 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection v. Signo Trading Int'l, Inc., 562 A.2d 251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Broadwell
Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Jack-
son Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1982); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), rev. denied, 717
P.2d 631 (Or. 1986); Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); City
of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp., 344 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
3. See Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541,
1549-50 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
A large number of law review articles have been written on this topic. These articles generally
document the variety of pollution exclusion clause interpretations in the federal courts, and then
propose suggestions to alleviate the interpretive conflicts. See infra part V. See also Brooke Jack-
son, Liability Insurance for Pollution Claims: Avoiding a Litigation Wasteland, 26 TULSA L.J. 209
(1990); Seth A. Ribner, Modern Environmental Insurance Law: "Sudden and Accidental," 63 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 755 (1989); Robert M. Tyler, Jr. & Todd J. Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses:
Problems in Interpretation and Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy,
17 IDAHO L. REv. 497 (1981); S. Hollis M. Greenlaw, Note, The CGL Policy and the Pollution
Exclusion Clause: Using the Drafting History to Raise the Interpretation Out of the Quagmire,
23 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 233 (1990). For a discussion comparing the old and the new language
of pollution exclusions, see generally Michael J. Geiger, Interpretations of the Pollution Exclu-
sions Clause: The Insurance Industry's Past, Present and Future Vehicle to Limit Liability, FED.
INS. & CORP. COUNSEL Q. 159 (1990); R. Stephen Burke, Comment, Pollution Exclusion Clauses:
1991] POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE
tainty regarding the scope of liability coverage under this clause drives
many of the hazardous waste and toxic tort lawsuits filed. 4 Courts have
interpreted the pollution exclusion clause variously, often admitting
that the law in this area is a confusing array of policy arguments and
conflicting drafting histories.5 Part II of this Note sets forth the histori-
cal framework of the CGL policies and environmental litigation, includ-
ing the role of recent congressional action in intensifying the
controversy. Part III examines the state supreme court decisions that
have interpreted the exclusion's "sudden and accidental" language. Fi-
nally, Part IV examines the solutions suggested by commentators in the
field and proposes an alternate resolution to this vexatious problem of
interpretation.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) Insurance Policies
Comprehensive general liability insurance protects businesses
against liability for damages to third parties.6 CGL policies are meant
to protect against most liabilities associated with business operations
including damages incurred through specified business activities.7 CGL
coverage generally requires that an insurer both defend the insured in
any litigation arising from the loss and indemnify the insured for any
payment made as a result of the loss.8 These standard policies offer lia-
The Agony, the Ecstasy, and the Irony for Insurance Companies, 17 N. Ky. L. REv. 443 (1990);
Jonathan C. Averback, Note, Comparing the Old and the New Pollution Exclusion Clauses in
General Liability Insurance Policies: New Language-Same Results?, 14 B.C. ENv'TL AYF. L. REv.
601 (1987). For a broad discussion of environmental liability insurance, see generally Kenneth S.
Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1988).
This Note, however, will focus on state supreme court decisions interpreting the "sudden and acci-
dental" language in the pollution exclusion clause. Moreover, this Note will demonstrate why in-
surers and insureds must cooperate to settle claims brought under the pollution exclusion.
4. Averback, Note, supra note 3, at 625-26.
5. Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 380 n.4 (N.C.
1986); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 577-78 (Wis. 1990). For a more compre-
hensive list of cases illustrating the various methods of interpreting the pollution exclusion clause,
see International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 522 N.E.2d 758 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988).
6. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 447.
7. Ballard & Manus, supra note 1, at 620.
A typical CGL policy promises "to pay on behalf of the insured all sums ... [it is] legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which the insurance
applies caused by an occurrence. . . ." Geiger, supra note 3, at 161 n.10. However, the policy can
and often does contain exclusionary clauses. The clauses exclude from coverage certain types of
liability that either the insured does not wish to purchase or the insurer does not want to provide.
The pollution exclusion clause discussed in this Note is one such exclusion. See Greenlaw, supra
note 3, at 233 n.4; see also Comment, supra note 3.
8. Geiger, supra note 3, at 161.
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bility protection for nearly all types of commercial ventures.9
Standardized insurance policies, such as the CGL, are attractive to
insurance companies because theoretically they are easy to interpret.10
Standardized policies are more efficient for industry use since they are
drafted only once. Besides saving manpower, standardized language is
also more efficient because once a court interprets the policy language
and establishes certain coverage, insurers can rely on that precedent in
estimating future risks.1
Judicial interpretation of policy language has a direct effect on an
insurer's risk of liability. If judicial construction of policy language is
narrow, losses that must be covered by the insurer are more infrequent.
If interpretation is broad and far-reaching, the insurer's risk grows
commensurately.
The larger concern relating to judicial interpretation of standard-
ized policy language is that by its very nature and usage, the language
in a standardized policy must be relatively broad and general.-2 In order
to apply the terms of a standardized policy to a wide spectrum of busi-
ness enterprises, the language used cannot be too specific or confining. 13
Unfortunately, such general language leaves room for interpretations
that were unintended by the insurers who drafted the CGL policy. 4
Moreover, most courts consider form policies to be contracts of adhe-
sion.' 5 Where policy language is deemed to be ambiguous, courts will
construe the meaning against the insurer.16
Ironically, while the CGL policy and its pollution exclusion were
meant to provide greater predictability and stability to underwriting
risk for pollution liability, the divergent interpretations of the exclusion
have added uncertainty. Recognizing the vagaries of judicial interpreta-
tion, the CGL drafters17 revised the policy several times to reflect both
9. See, e.g., id.; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 498.
10. Averback, Note, supra note 3, at 604. A standardized policy is a form policy. It is drafted
by the insurance industry for general use by a variety of companies, businesses, and industries. A
form policy differs from a manuscript policy in which each term is bargained for and predicated
upon an insured's individualized insurance needs.
11. Id. at 604-05. Because after such a case the insurance industry knows how courts will
construe specific terms common to all CGL policies, insurers can estimate the likelihood of liability
under those established definitions. Predictability is thus served.
12. Id. at 605.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See 2 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 10A.03[2] (1990). Regard-
less of an insured's knowledge, expertise, or ability to bargain for expansion of coverage, many
courts apply the doctrine of contra preferentum to insurers freely. Id.
16. Averback, Note, supra note 3, at 605 n.28.
17. The Insurance Services Office (ISO) is responsible for drafting CGL form policies. The
ISO is an insurance trade organization in which more than 1400 companies participate. One of the
main tasks of the organization is to draft form policies and language and to secure approval for the
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the changing needs of the insurance industry and the coverage concerns
of businesses."'
B. Redrafting the CGL Policy to Address Interpretive Uncertainty
1. The Change from Accident-Based to Occurrence-Based Liability
Prior to 1966, CGL policies based liability on "accidents," not "oc-
currences."1 9 Over time, the interpretation of the term "accident" be-
came a source of controversy.20 Courts construed the term broadly,
while businesses clamored for wider coverage that was not limited by
the notion of a fortuitous happening."' The Insurance Services Office
(ISO) switched from accident-based to occurrence-based liability in
1966 to address these concerns.2
The revised CGL policy defined occurrence as an accident resulting
in damages neither expected nor intended by the insured.23 While the
definition of the term "occurrence" included continuous or repeated ex-
posure to injurious conditions, it is unclear whether the term was meant
to include gradual environmental pollution. 4 Insurers wanted to focus
coverage only on unforeseeable damage, thereby emphasizing the re-
sponsibility of industry to oversee the safe disposal of hazardous
waste.25
use of such policies from the pertinent state regulatory bodies. Most major American insurers who
issue comprehensive general liability insurance follow ISO wording. Ballard & Manus, supra note
1, 621 & n.41.
18. See James A. Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 Fo-
RUM 551, 552-53 (1980).
19. See LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.04[1][a]; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 499; Averback,
Note, supra note 3, at 607.
20. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.04[1][a].
21. Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 499. Consumers were demanding liability protection
unlimited by notions of "accidents," while at the same time courts were reading the "accident"
term quite broadly. Id. Faced with both consumer and judicial hostility to the narrowness of "acci-
dent," insurers adopted the "occurrence" language.
22. See generally supra note 19.
23. Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 499 (stating that "the term occurrence is defined as 'an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured"' (quoting
William R. Fish, An Overview of the 1973 Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy and
Products Liability Coverage, 34 J. Mo. B. 257, 258 (1978))); see also LONG, supra note 15, §
10A.04[1][b].
24. LONG, supra note 15, §§ 10a.04[1][b], 1OA.04[2]. Long suggests that this is a point of
contention between the insurance industry and policyholders. Insurers have long held the belief
that CGL policies were meant to insure against fortuitous happenings. To be fortuitous, these
events must contain an element of suddenness or surprise. Policyholders, however, have claimed
that the very drafting of an exclusion shows that insurers considered gradual events to be covered
under the general language of the policy. Id. § 10A.04[2]. See also Averback, Note, supra note 3, at
607.
25. See Hourihan, supra note 18, at 553.
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The initial fundamental coverage of the CGL policy promises to
pay the legal obligations of the insured resulting from an "occur-
rence." 26 With such encompassing language, the insurer must begin by
assuming coverage.17 This basic liability language, however, does con-
tain a caveat: coverage is conditioned upon damages resulting from an
occurrence.2 s Thus, the tension between the meaning of the "occur-
rence" language and liability for losses caused by pollution became ob-
vious to the insurance industry.29
While the switch to occurrence-based liability was not meant to
provide coverage for insureds who knowingly discharged pollutants as
part of their everyday business,30 the definition of the term "occur-
rence" was too broad to avoid this liability. Courts continued to find
coverage for intentional pollution damage even after the policy
change1
Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.32 is an ex-
ample of the unwillingness of courts to hold businesses liable for manu-
facturing processes that regularly contaminate the environment. The
insured in Grand River sought coverage for allegations of bodily injury
and property damage arising from a seven-year period of toxic emis-
sions caused by quarrying operations." Ohio Casualty, the insurer, ar-
gued that the insured had to expect damages after seven years of
emissions.3 4 The court disagreed, drawing a distinction between in-
tending to emit and expecting damage caused by the emitting activity. 5
While it granted that the policy definition of the term "occurrence"
consists in part of the notion of "accident," the court refused to give
"occurrence" any of the temporal meaning supposedly embodied in the
term "accident."3 6 Instead, the court construed "occurrence" as being
26. See generally Geiger, supra note 3, at 161 n.10 (stating that the CGL policy will "pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies caused by an
occurrence").
27. Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 498.
28. See id. at 499; LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.04[1][b]; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 499.
29. Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 501.
30. Id. at 499-500.
31. See, e.g., Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978) (stating that the term
"occurrence" covered a four-year period of pollution discharge from a pulp paper plant); Grand
River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (holding that a
seven-year period of air pollution constituted an "occurrence").
32. 289 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972). For a more complete explication of the ramifica-
tions of Grand River, see Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 501-04.
33. Grand River, 289 N.E.2d at 362.
34. Id. at 365.
35. Id.
36. The court noted, "[W]e think it better not to interpret the word 'occurrence' in a sudden
or momentary sense, but permit such term to encompass a period of time." Id.
[Vol. 45:161
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broader than "accident" for coverage purposes.37 Thus, the Grand River
court renounced the idea that the occurrence language restricted an in-
surer's liability only to events sudden in time.
The court required more than a demonstration of a long history of
pollution in order to exclude coverage. It required a showing that the
specific damage caused was expected or intended.38 Damage resulting
from ongoing actions, such as ordinary business operations, would not
lead necessarily to a ruling that the damage was expected because the
court deemed the foreseeability of such damage insufficient to exempt
the insurer from liability.3 9 The court's differentiation between in-
tended acts and intended damage signalled an unwillingness to restrict
pollution coverage with a limiting definition of "occurrence."
Spurred by far-reaching decisions similar to Grand River, the in-
surance industry foresaw the potential for large liability awards. Once
again the ISO bowed to broad judicial interpretation and began to re-
draft the CGL policy.40 By 1970, CGL policies included the pollution
exclusion as a mandatory endorsement. 1 Finally, in 1973, the pollution
exclusion was inserted into the body of the policy.4 2
2. The Pollution Exclusion
The pollution exclusion clause exempts from coverage damages
caused by certain kinds of pollution. The standard pollution exclusion
in use from 1973 to 1985 4 stated:
This insurance does not apply ... (f) to bodily injury or property damage arising
out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course
or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.44
Thus, pollution damage is exempted from coverage unless caused by a
"sudden and accidental" event. The standard CGL policy leaves "sud-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.04[2].
41. Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 500 & n.24. While the pollution exclusion was not yet
part of the body of the policy, the ISO saw a clear need for the exclusionary language and made it
a required attachment to every issued CGL. See also Averback, Note, supra note 3, at 608.
42. Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 500 & n.24; Averback, Note, supra note 3, at 608.
43. By 1985 the insurance industry could no longer bear the immense cost of claims from
pollution damage. Consequently, the ISO eradicated all coverage for pollution-related occurrences
under the CGL policy. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.04[3]. In theory, insureds may negotiate and
purchase endorsements for pollution liability as additions to the form policy; in reality, however,
the cost of such endorsements may be so high as to eliminate virtually all pollution coverage.
44. Ballard & Manus, supra note 1, at 613.
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den and accidental" undefined.4 5 By leaving such an important excep-
tion to the exclusion undefined, the drafters of the CGL created a gap
in the policy, providing an impetus for litigation.
a. The Drafting History: Two Different Perspectives
To add more uncertainty to the interpretation of the exclusionary
language, the drafting history of the pollution exclusion itself is contra-
dictory and unclear. The clouded intentions of the ISO in adopting the
"sudden and accidental" language also encourage litigation over cover-
age.46 Not surprisingly, insurers and policyholders have sharply con-
trasting views as to the proper interpretation of the exclusion's drafting
history.
(i). The Insurers' Perspective
Some commentators believe that the ISO drafted the pollution ex-
clusion to guard against judicial interpretations of the CGL that broad-
ened the definition of "occurrence" and led to increased liability for
pollution-based damage.47 Under this limitation view of the exclusion,
45. Id. at 613-14. Under the exclusionary language, insurers must provide coverage for pollu-
tion-related damage only when it can be characterized as "sudden and accidental." This provides
an incentive for policyholders to use every argument and possible interpretation at their disposal
in an attempt to fit pollution-related events into the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
pollution exclusion.
46. With a variety of IS0 intentions ascribed to the addition of the exclusion to the policy, a
litigant simply may pick the rationale that best supports its own argument and hope that the court
will find its reasoning persuasive. At least one commentator has criticized judicial reliance on this
conflicting drafting history. Ribner, supra note 3, at 792-93. The insurance industry's reliance on
these statements of intention may be misplaced unless it recognizes that the meaning of the terms
"accident" and "occurrence" may change over time. Id.
47. See, e.g., LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.04[2]; Robert A. Zeavin & Eric J. Schindler, Clear-
ing the Air on CGL's Pollution Exclusion Clause, 4 HAZARDOUS WASTE & Toxic TORTS L. &
STRATEGY, Oct. 1988, at 1, 1:
The exclusion was developed as an industry response to the exponential increase in the liabil-
ity exposure of insurers amid expanding common law and statutory environmental liabilities,
and the uncertainty and unpredictability that courts created in interpreting pre-1966 "acci-
dent" policies and post-1966 "occurrence" policies in hazardous waste/toxic tort coverage
litigation.
Id. at 6; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 3:
The insurer's concern arose from the burgeoning environmental lawsuits in combination with
the clause in the definition of occurrence which reads "continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions." The quoted language is suggestive of manufacturing and industrial processes
which produce pollution over a substantial period of time. The pollution exclusion was the
insurance companies' response to the fear of increased exposure in environmental litigation.
Id. at 506; id. at 508; E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the
Looking Glass, 74 GEo. L.J. 1237, 1251 (1986) (stating that "[tihe insurers' primary concern was
that the occurrence-based policies, drafted before large scale industrial pollution attracted wide
public attention, seemed tailor-made to extend coverage to most pollution situations. Conse-
quently, they tacked onto the occurrence-based policies an exclusionary clause that applied specifi-
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the drafters sought to restrict coverage by accepting liability only when
a pollution occurrence is sudden and accidental. Under the main body
of the exclusion, pollution-related damages are exempted from cover-
age. The "sudden and accidental" language reinstates a limited amount
of coverage under the policy.
Thus, one drafting interpretation holds that in response to deci-
sions such as Grand River, which was a harbinger of judicial interpreta-
tions sympathetic to compensation for hazardous waste cleanup, the
insurance industry further restricted coverage for pollution damages.
Under this interpretation, not only must the damage first satisfy the
"occurrence" requirement, but the release or dispersal of the pollutants
also must be "sudden and accidental" to trigger coverage for the event.
The ISO may have intended the pollution exclusion clause to function
as a filter, restricting further judicial broadening of "occurrence" to in-
clude gradual environmental pollution.
Additionally, the ISO saw the provision of coverage for gradual pol-
lution damage as contrary to public policy.4" Public focus was centering
rapidly on the environmental ramifications of industrial processes. The
publication of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson set off initial public
alarm.4 The Love Canal debacle in 1969 and the large Unocal oil spill
at about the same time raised national consciousness of the scope and
magnitude of America's hazardous waste problem.5 0 In light of this in-
creased public awareness, the drafters of the pollution exclusion may
have intended it not only to limit the insurance industry's liability for
damages from industrial business practices, but also to encourage poli-
cyholders to take greater precautionary measures when using processes
that could result in environmental harm.51 The insurance industry
hoped that restricted coverage would force businesses to clean up their
cally to pollution related claims" (footnote omitted)); Averback, Note, supra note 3, at 607-08
(stating that the pollution exclusion was designed to limit rapidly growing liability for pollution
events); Geiger, supra note 3, at 163 (stating that "the object of the clause was to address the
problem of potentially limitless claims by covering only those accidents distinct in time and
place").
48. Note, supra note 47, at 1253 n.82.
49. LoNG, supra note 15, § 10A.01[3]. Silent Spring was one of the first books to bring the
topic of environmental pollution to the public forefront. The book dramatized the danger of pesti-
cides, heightening public awareness of the fragility of the environment. Silent Spring set the stage
for the "green" movements of the late 1960s.
50. Id. In the Love Canal contamination, hazardous chemicals had been dumped and later
covered by fill to form the foundation for a subdivision in Niagara, New York. Id. The inhabitants
of the area were found to have much higher incidences of cancer, miscarriage, and birth defects
than the nation at large. Id. The Unocal oil spill was caused by oil leaks from a drilling platform
directly off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. Id.
51. Note, supra note 47, at 1253 & n.82.
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industrial waste by-products.2 Under this view, indemnification by the
insurer would be contrary to public policy because it would encourage
industry to maintain the status quo instead of providing an incentive to
seek cleaner, safer methods of production."
By avoiding coverage for gradual pollution, the pollution exclusion
clause also may limit the moral hazard of intentional pollution.54 Insur-
ance is not meant to provide coverage for the day to day expenses in-
curred in business activity; instead it is meant to cover unexpected and
unintended losses. Gradual pollution may be less likely to result from a
fortuitous incident.5 Thus, damages resulting from gradual pollution
should be includable in the normal cost of business enterprise. Other-
wise, businesses would have little incentive to reduce the risk of pollu-
tion, and the insurer, rather than the business itself, would bear the
costs of normal business operation.55 Additionally, if pollution is part of
a business's normal operations, it is likely that contamination or the
release of pollutants is highly foreseeable to the insured so coverage
should be excluded under the "occurrence" requirement. 7
Not only could the pollution exclusion protect insurers from judi-
cial expansion of liability, but it could also force policyholders to recog-
nize the harmful effects of some industrial processes. For this reason,
the insurance industry has argued that the pollution exclusion exacts
separate liability requirements and provides different incentives than
the basic "occurrence" language in the main coverage portion of the
CGL.5 As a result, the exclusion makes coverage for pollution-related
damage much more difficult for courts to find.
(ii). The Policyholders' Perspective
Contrary to the insurance industry's rationale for the exclusionary
language, policyholders have argued that the exclusion was meant only
as a reiteration of the "occurrence" requirement. 59 According to policy-
holders, the ISO itself has demonstrated this intention. One standard
explanation disseminated by those ISO officials responsible for assisting
state insurance commissioners was that since expected or intended pol-
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1253 n.82.
54. Abraham, supra note 3, at 953. One of the purposes of policy exclusions is to eliminate
moral hazard. Id. at 952. Insurance is meant to protect a policyholder from fortuitous harm and
not from harm intentionally created by the insured. Id. Intentionally caused harm-the collection
of damages for the insured's own behavior-is the moral hazard. Id.
55. Id. at 953.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See generally supra note 47.
59. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.04[2].
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lution-related damages were excluded by the occurrence language, the
pollution exclusion clause was meant only to clarify and provide height-
ened notice of the uninsurability of this type of damage."0 This clarifi-
cation, however, was itself rather unclear.8 1 It seemed to ignore the fact
that the occurrence requirement focuses on unintentional damage from
pollution while the exclusion focuses on the actual release or dispersal
of pollutants causing damage.6 2 Thus, there is at least one difference in
coverage requirements between the language of the policy and that of
the exclusion. Consequently, even the supposedly helpful memorandum
from the ISO' s is subject to interpretational difficulties.
One commentator suggests that the insurance industry adopted the
exclusion to preclude both reckless and intentional polluters from cov-
erage."" This interpretation too would make the exclusion a mere clarifi-
cation or restatement of occurrence-based liability.65 Comments from
some insurance representatives made in an attempt to persuade state
insurance commissioners to endorse the new exclusion in their respec-
tive states indicate that clarification was the sole purpose behind the
additional language.6 6
Since state insurance commissioners seemed concerned that the
new language effected a limitation on liability,67 the extent to which
these remarks were industry posturing designed to facilitate the state
commissioners' approval remains unknown. It is unclear whether the
commissioners would have approved the language of the exclusion had
it been presented to them as a limitation device and not as a reaffirma-
60. The memorandum itself stated somewhat ambiguously:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most cases under present policies
because the damages can be said to be expected or intended and thus are excluded by the
definition of occurrence. The above exclusion clarifies this situation so as to avoid any ques-
tion of intent. Coverage is continued for pollution or contamination caused injuries when the
pollution or contamination results from an accident.
Ballard & Manus, supra note 1, at 626 (quoting Insurance Rating Board, Submission to Ins.
Comm'r of W. Va. (May 18, 1970)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See supra note 60.
64. Greenlaw, Note, supra note 3, at 246. Greenlaw attempts to show that the drafting his-
tory supports the view that the scope of the pollution exclusion is coextensive with the definition
of occurrence. The author believes the exclusion was meant only to clarify the policy and not to
further limit liability to events that are strictly "sudden and accidental," in the narrowest sense.
65. Id. at 272.
66. Representatives from Travelers Indemnity Company pointed out during review by the
West Virginia Insurance Commissioner that the "'idea behind [the pollution exclusion clause] is
that the insurance industry does not consider intentional pollution to be insurable, and the indus-
try wishes to make its position clear to the insured."' Id. at 249 (quoting Letter from Richard C.
Reeves, Assistant Secretary, Government Affairs Division, The Travelers Indemnity Co., to the
Honorable Samuel H. Weese, Insurance Commissioner, State of West Virginia (Aug. 30, 1970)).
67. Greenlaw, Note, supra note 3, at 248.
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tion of noncoverage for intended or expected damage."8
b. An Early Interpretation of the Exclusion: Lansco, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection
Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection9 was the
first in a string of early cases to find that the pollution exclusion was a
reiteration of the definition of "occurrence" and not a further limitation
on liability.70 The court collapsed the pollution exclusion into the
meaning of "occurrence," denying any difference in meaning between
the two. 1
In Lansco vandals opened valves on two oil storage tanks causing
14,000 gallons of oil to spill onto the company's property, flow into a
drainage system, and eventually pollute a nearby river. Lansco sued its
insurers for indemnification when they refused to cover the cost of envi-
ronmental cleanup. The New Jersey Superior Court found coverage,
holding that the "sudden and accidental" language of the exclusion
merely restates the "unexpected and unintended" definition of "occur-
rence." 72 Thus, the court rejected the view that the exclusion provides
greater restrictions on coverage than the occurrence language does. By
refusing to so hold, the court in effect was able to finance all cleanup
operations through insurance dollars.
Some courts have followed the initial interpretation of Lansco and
have refused to find stricter requirements for coverage inherent in the
pollution exclusion. 3 Other courts, however, have acknowledged the
difficulty in choosing which drafting history provides the more correct
version of the exclusionary rationale and have been wary of entering the
interpretational fray.74
C. CERCLA Liability: The Taint of Detrimental Uncertainty
Since 1980 when Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),7 5 the incen-
68. Id. at 252.
69. 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), affd, 368 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976), cert. denied, 372 A.2d 322 (N.J. 1977).
70. Zeavin & Schindler, supra note 47, at 6.
71. Id.
72. Lansco, 350 A.2d at 524.
73. See, e.g., Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 451
A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978).
74. Geiger, supra note 3, at 163. See, e.g., Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570,
573-75 (Wis. 1990) (discussing the drafting history).
75. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
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tive to find coverage under CGL policies for pollution-related damages
has heightened. Congress intended CERCLA to put bite into the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) formerly ineffectual attempts to
force private-sector industry to assume responsibility for hazardous
waste releases into the environment.7 6 CERCLA gives the EPA far-
reaching powers to clean up polluted sites at the cost of the sites' past
or present owners and operators.77 For industry, this leaves very few
ways to escape liability.7s In effect, CERCLA functions as a strict liabil-
ity statute. 79
CERCLA strikes fear in the hearts of corporations. Cleanup costs
are so high that if businesses are forced to bear the cost of environmen-
tal remediation alone, their financial viability may be threatened. Faced
with the potential for astronomical cleanup costs, polluters are seeking
to shift their liability burdens onto their insurers.80 Many businesses
potentially are liable for pollution dating back to the early 1960s that
since has contaminated groundwater and the surrounding soil.8 ' These
businesses may have been unaware thirty years ago that their disposal
methods would have huge future monetary repercussions. Cleanup of
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
76.
The stated purposes of CERCLA are to empower the federal government and the states to
take legal action against parties responsible for unauthorized releases of hazardous substances
into the environment; to provide funds for government cleanup efforts where quick action is
necessary or the responsible parties cannot be identified; to collect information about hazard-
ous waste sites, particularly abandoned or inactive sites; and to assist cleanup efforts by re-
quiring prompt notification by responsible parties of any release or substantial threat of
release of hazardous substances into the environment.
LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.02[1][c].
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9607; see Brooke Jackson, Environmental Cleanups and Insurance: Isn't
there a Better Way?, 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA), at 767 (Aug. 10, 1990).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). CERCLA excuses an innocent landowner from liability if the owner
undertook appropriate inquiry into the property before purchasing it and had no notice, either
actual or constructive, of the potential for hazardous waste problems. Id. Also, an owner who ac-
quires contaminated property through bequest or inheritance will not be held liable for its cleanup.
Id. These conditions for nonliability are extremely difficult to establish as they hinge upon concep-
tions of notice, due investigation, and specific circumstances surrounding the disposal of the waste.
Clearly, the EPA will push hard to denominate as many entities as possible as potentially responsi-
ble parties. This gives the EPA a greater likelihood of collecting enough money to finance a
cleanup before resorting to expenditure of government funds.
79. A party that has previously or is currently associated "with hazardous substances, as a
generator, transporter or disposer, may face liability under CERCLA should those substances be
released into the environment, and cause the government to incur response costs." LONG, supra
note 15, § 10A.02[1][c][i].
80. Id. § 10A.04. With such huge costs weighing upon American corporations, it has been
suggested by at least one commentator that corporate directors may even have a fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its shareholders to shift such liability onto its general insurers. Id.
81. LONG, supra note 15, at § 10A.04.
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hazardous waste sites is extremely expensive8 2 and the number and
scope of environmental contaminations in the United States as a whole
are frightening. Currently, decontamination costs are estimated at over
eight hundred billion dollars for the nation's known polluted sites."3
Insurance works best when it is premised on discernible risk.84 In-
surers cannot set appropriate premium rates confidently with unknow-
able future risks."5 The inability to predict losses within a delineated
coverage area deprives insurers of both the ability to estimate their suc-
cess rate in spreading losses by diversification and to set an appropriate
price for coverage. 6 When environmental liability is uncertain, when
insurers are unable to predict losses statistically, the insurance system
no longer functions efficiently.
Unfortunately, the insurance industry did not anticipate the strict
liability provisions of CERCLA. 17 Even during the 1970s when insurers
were drafting the pollution exclusion and inserting it into policies, the
industry did not foresee the enactment of CERCLA or the overarching
congressional movement to force businesses to pay for pollution dam-
ages. Insurers argue that they did not intend for their policies to cover
enormous liabilities like those imposed under CERCLA.85
CERCLA is a harshly worded statute from the insurers' perspective
because liability can be retroactive. Regardless of when hazardous ma-
terial was deposited or transported, liability turns on the release or
threatened release of contaminating pollutants.8 ' Retroactive strict lia-
bility creates uncertainty that is very dangerous to the insurance indus-
try. It entails culpability for damages that result from actions that were
not subject to liability at the time of perpetration."
Both policyholders and insurers can anticipate ordinary strict lia-
bility, including it in cost calculations of regular business operation.
Thus, financial resources can be allocated in anticipation of the imposi-
tion of such liability.9' Policyholders and insurers, however, generally
82. "No field of liability involves more far-reaching statutory civil liabilities than those im-
posed by the federal Superfund and similar state regimes." Abraham, supra note 3, at 956.
83. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.03[1]. With these huge sums at stake, it is unlikely that litiga-
tion between corporate policyholders and their insurers will taper off in the immediate future. See
id. § 10A.02[1][c][i].
84. Abraham, supra note 3, at 947.
85. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.04.
86. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 3, at 952 n.31.
87. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.03[1].
88. Id. As one commentator has stated, "[P]rior to the enactment of many of the environ-
mental statutes of the 1980's, neither the insured nor the insurer had the remotest idea that such
laws would be passed by legislative bodies or upheld by the courts." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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cannot anticipate findings of liability under a CERCLA strict liability
scheme.92 No planning, financial or otherwise, can ameliorate the effect
this kind of potential liability can have on the coffers of a polluting
company and its insurers. Consequently, insurers doubt the prudence of
providing coverage in a climate of such unpredictable "legal change.""3
The premiums paid before the enactment of CERCLA also did not re-
flect the possibility of higher future retroactive liability that the statute
creates. CERCLA caught insurers unaware and unprepared for higher
risks of liability imposed upon past behavior of the policyholder."4
The inherent nature of CERCLA as a strict liability statute 5
presents insurers with additional uncertainty problems. The activities
of policyholders that give rise to potential liability have become difficult
risks to insure against because, under CERCLA, undiscoverable risks
may be held actionable many years after the initial undertaking. 6 Re-
gardless of whether an action was reasonable when it was taken, inesti-
mable liability may attach at some future date. Thus, even had insurers
foreseen the passage of CERCLA and its concomitant imposition of
great liability risk, and even had insurers charged higher premiums to
ward against these new actions, uncertainty would still cause unpredict-
able losses.9 7 Confronted with a disproportionate ratio of risk to pre-
mium that may undermine their financial viability, insurers have an
incentive to dispute coverage under the ill-defined pollution exclusion. 8
Moreover, the rush to shift CERCLA damages onto insurers abro-
gates the purpose of the statute.99 Insurers argue that Congress passed
CERCLA in part to make industry acknowledge and account for envi-
ronmental externalities involved in manufacturing processes. 1°0 Con-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Jackson, supra note 77, at 768:
Since the underwriters did not anticipate the enormous superfund and other environmental
claims of today, they did not charge premiums commensurate with the risk. A contract is a
contract, but the fact remains that many insurers face threats to their profitability, if not
their survival, as ominous as those facing those who are insured.
95. Strict liability holds a defendant culpable for "the failure to reduce risks that could not
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable care." Abraham, supra note 3, at 957.
96. Id. at 958.
97. With the current state of technology, insurers cannot predict which chemicals or wastes
may be harmful at some point in the distant future. Thus, under the strict liability format of
CERCLA, risks are still unpredictable because the synergistic effects between various wastes and
the environment are unknown.
98. Abraham, supra note 3, at 957.
99. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
100. Comprehensive Environmental Resource, Conservation & Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (statement of Sen. Albert Gore, Jr.).
Congress no longer wanted society to bear the costs of hazardous waste cleanup where genera-
tors, transporters, owners, and operators have profited from processes causing contamination. See
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gress enacted CERCLA partially to provide an incentive for businesses
to find cleaner methods of manufacturing and safer methods of dispo-
sal.10 1 Shifting losses directly onto insurers does not provide this incen-
tive as envisioned by Congress.0 2
The industrial community, however, might bankrupt itself in pay-
ment of CERCLA claims. Even worse, because of the high cost of
cleanup, remediation projects still may remain underfunded and incom-
plete after the responsible parties under CERCLA have exhausted their
resources in payment of the claims. Courts may become concerned that
no entity will be legally or financially available to clean up contami-
nated land or water entirely and then may issue result-oriented deci-
sions in the name of public policy. Courts may rule based on the notion
that someone must clean up the contamination to protect society from
further injury. 0 3
Judicial decisionmaking, therefore, is complicated by competing
public policy concerns and the practical implications of potential liabil-
ity under CERCLA. The risk of uncertainty under CERCLA, a syner-
gistic by-product of the above-discussed factors, wreaks havoc on the
insurance industry's ability to anticipate future losses and provide for
such losses financially. 04 In the area of environmental risk, uncertain-
ties have resulted in the underanticipation of losses. Policyholders may
find themselves without adequate coverage for CERCLA liabilities and
insurers may go bankrupt paying out cleanup dollars under policies
that never contemplated the imposition of the strict liability scheme of
CERCLA and its state statutory counterparts.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION
Like the inestimable risks under CERCLA, judicial construction of
policy language also may lead to unpredictable liability. Any expansive
reading of coverage language for environmental damages has a great im-
pact on insurers due to the large dollar amounts involved.105 Judge-
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (stating that
those responsible for pollution damages should bear the cost of rectifying them).
101. Comprehensive Environmental Resource, Conservation & Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (statement of Sen. Albert Gore, Jr.).
102. See generally Abraham, supra note 3 (providing a detailed study of the effects of the
"new" environmental liability upon the insurance industry and the concomitant availability of
coverage).
103. As traditional "deep pocket" defendants, insurers may be placed in the position of be-
coming de facto guardians of the environment.
104. See Abraham, supra note 3, at 946-47 (noting that "[i]nsurance operates most comforta-
bly with stochastic events, in which the probability of the frequency and magnitude of insured
losses that will be suffered by a group of policyholders is highly predictable").
105. Abraham, supra note 3, at 960 n.52.
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made insurance is not a new phenomenon. Judges have long interpreted
policies to find coverage by manipulating policy language and courts
often attempt to construe policies to provide protection to consum-
ers."' s This is part of the rationale behind contra preferentem.0 7 To the
extent these judicial constructions of policy language are unanticipated,
they create uncertainty for future losses.'0
Judicial interpretations that ignore or manipulate apparent mean-
ings in a policy create even greater market instability than do unantici-
pated statutory schemes.'09 While insurers can redraft policy language
to avoid coverage under delineated statutes, this is much more difficult
to do with judge-made insurance. The meaning imparted by a court is
usually different than the apparent one and courts each may interpret
the language differently. 110 Insurers are left unable to rely on the lan-
guage in their own policies. As a result, insurers must either draft new
language, beginning again the whole interpretive process, or drop cover-
age for a particular risk from the policy entirely."'
Because the arguments both for and against coverage turn on inter-
106. Id. at 960-61; cf. LONG, supra note 15:
It ignores reality to say that large, national corporations should be treated the same way as
small individual purchasers of insurance when it comes to policy interpretation. . . . virtu-
ally all American corporations of any size employ in-house risk managers who are experts in
the business of insurance... . While the insurance industry may utilize policy language which
some refer to as "standard," the insurance representatives of corporate America are well
aware of precisely what each "standard" phrase means.
Id. § 10A.03[2].
107. Contra preferentum is a doctrine applied to contract interpretation. Basically, the doc-
trine requires any contractual ambiguities to be construed against the contract's drafter. For a
discussion of contra preferentum as used and misused in the environmental context, see LONG,
supra note 15, at § 10A.03[2]. Courts give the doctrine heavy weight when the contract at issue is a
form contract. Courts are thus loath to interpret form policies against insureds since they often
view insurance policies as contracts of adhesion. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See
also New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987);
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. DeJames, 261 A.2d 747 (Md. 1970). Thus, corporations argua-
bly should not receive as much judicially wrought protection as should an individual insured. In
the environmental area, some courts have gone beyond construing ambiguities in favor of the indi-
vidual policyholder and have found coverage even when contrary language applies if the policy-
holder is a large business entity capable of retaining expert counsel, is a sophisticated negotiator,
and has some amount of bargaining power. Abraham, supra note 3, at 960-61; LONG, supra note 15,
at § 10A.03[2].
108. At least statutory liabilities creating uninsurable uncertainties can be mitigated by the
addition of exclusions, coverage limitations, and larger deductibles to the policy. Abraham, supra
note 3, at 961. This is not the case with unanticipated judicial interpretations, however. Id.
109. Id.
110. "[T]here is no completely reliable way to draft around the threat of judge-made insur-
ance, because by definition this is coverage that ignores the apparent meaning of the policy lan-
guage itself." Id.
111. This is exactly what happened with the pollution exclusion in the CGL. See note 7 and
accompanying text; see generally Averback, Note, supra note 3.
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pretations of insurance policy language, state law governs.112 Because
insurance doctrine traditionally has been an area of state governance,
the United States Supreme Court will be loath to end the interpretive
controversy by accepting a case involving such issues."" Courts will
continue to construe the pollution exclusion in various ways, often act-
ing on their own social welfare agendas and the differing traditions of
contract construction in each state. The danger is that the cost of liti-
gating this kind of issue will rise dramatically as more environmental
cleanups are needed and insurers and insureds fight to determine the
most hospitable forums for their arguments." 4
Because of the high cost of litigating environmental coverage
claims and the possibility of setting an adverse precedent,, few parties
have an incentive to carry such litigation to its conclusion. Settlement is
a more attractive option. 1 5 While many environmental insurance cover-
age cases are filed, few have been tried to conclusion. 116 This adds yet
another wrinkle to the problem. With relatively few cases being tried
and appealed, few state supreme courts have been able to rule on the
issues concerned.
A. Common Analytical Frameworks
The definition of "sudden and accidental" is one of the most liti-
gated issues in pollution exclusion disputes." 7 While the range of inter-
112. See infra part 11.B; Ribner, supra note 3.
113. Jackson, supra note 77, at 768.
114. Forum shopping has become extremely important as parties race to see who can file suit
first in a jurisdiction with favorable case law. Judith S. Roth, Dispute Over CGL Coverage Makes
1988 an Eventful Year, 4 HAZARDOUS WASTE & Toxic TORTS L. & STRATEGY, Dec. 1988, at 1, 1.
A Maryland district court has accused New Jersey of promulgating a body of law that is proin-
sured regarding environmental liability in an effort to attract industry. Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (D. Md. 1989). The court warned:
It is entirely proper for the courts of New Jersey, subject to legislative strictures, to make
rulings on questions of law against the background of what they perceive the underlying pub-
lic policy of the state to be. However, a state's legitimate interest in attracting corporate
business does not justify its encouragement of forum shopping to its own courts or its intru-
sion upon the sovereign power of its sister states to make their own decisions concerning
matters directly affecting their interests within their borders.
Id. at 1258.
115. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.03[2]; Geiger, supra note 3, at 163. Cf. Roth, supra note 114,
at 6. The insurer may agree in settlement to buy back the environmental coverage for the years it
was in effect with the policyholder. This allows the insurer to avoid any further claims on the part
of the policyholder for similar damages.
116. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.03[2].
117. It is not surprising that policyholders focus on the "sudden and accidental" language
since the policies provide coverage for pollution events considered sudden and accidental. With
"sudden," the main argument seems to be over whether the word contains a temporal element, i.e.,
whether coverage is confined to instantaneous events. While "accidental" is also open to interpre-
tation, the insurance industry has long used the notion of an "accident" for limitations on coverage
POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE
pretation is broad, some common judicial analyses have emerged during
the past seventeen years of litigation. The various interpretations fall
roughly into three categories. First, a court may decide that the clause
is ambiguous. i" The typical CGL policy does not define "sudden and
accidental," and these words could have several different meanings. If
the policy is determined to be ambiguous, under insurance contract law
most courts will resort to contra preferentem and hold that the policy
covers the pollution damage.
If the phrase is not considered ambiguous, the court must define it.
Many courts will interpret the phrase to mean "unexpected and unin-
tended." The courts in this second category hold that the exclusion lan-
guage reiterates the coverage limitations provided through the
definition of occurrence.119 Thus, coverage for gradual pollution events
often will be covered. Courts using this analysis may not recognize the
distinction between the basic coverage language and that of the exclu-
sion: a covered "occurrence" is one in which damage is unintended and
unexpected, while the pollution exclusion reinstates coverage where the
release of pollutants is sudden and accidental. Courts that recognize
this distinction will usually reject the reiteration theory of the
exclusion.
Finally, courts may view the "sudden and accidental" language as
limiting coverage otherwise granted under the term "occurrence." '120
These courts often will perceive a temporal element in the word "sud-
den" and define "accidental" as something akin to "unintended." 21 By
and thus the term may not be as difficult to interpret.
In addition to the meaning of "sudden and accidental," policyholders and insurers have liti-
gated whether a particular contaminant falls within the subject matter of the exclusion. Averback,
Note, supra note 3, at 615; see, e.g., Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977); Autotronic Sys. Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504
(1982); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 664 P.2d 1262 (Wash. App. 1983).
Insurers and insureds have also litigated the meaning of "damages" under the exclusion. See
Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513 (N.D. Fla. 1988); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Independent Petrochemi-
cal Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334 (D.D.C. 1986); Centennial Ins. Co. v.
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Penn. 1987). Both of these broad areas
of contention are beyond the scope of this Note.
118. Averback, Note, supra note 3, at 612; see, e.g., Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins.
Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga.
1989); Shapiro v. Public Service Mutual Ins. Co., 477 N.E.2d 146 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Just v.
Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
119. Id. at 623-24; see, e.g., National Grange Mutual Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
650 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 350
A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 368 A.2d 363 (1976); Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990).
120. See, e.g., Technicon Elect. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 542 N.E.2d 1048
(N.Y. 1989); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986).
121. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich.
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utilizing this approach, courts are able to give separate meaning to each
word in the exclusion.
B. State Supreme Court Interpretations
While insurance traditionally has been considered a state concern,
few state supreme courts have ruled on the correct interpretation of the
pollution exclusion under state law. Many pollution liability cases arise
in connection with CERCLA liability, making the litigation a federal
question and offering the opportunity to bring the claim in federal
court. Unfortunately, however, this means that federal judges will be
interpreting state law for the meaning of the coverage language. In the
majority of cases, a state's supreme court has not ruled on the issues
involved, leaving the federal courts with little guidance for determining
what that state's law would be."22
1. Maine: Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dingwell 23
In 1980 the Maine Supreme Court confronted the familiar, but still
undefined, language of the pollution exclusion. Travelers Indemnity Co.
v. Dingwell was one of the earliest cases to reach a state supreme court
on the "sudden and accidental" interpretive issue. The insured,
Dingwell, operated an industrial waste facility in Gray, Maine. The resi-
dents of the town brought a class action suit against him, seeking dam-
ages for contamination of the town's well water. Dingwell's three
insurers brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether
they were obligated to defend and indemnify Dingwell under the CGL
policies. While the language in the three policies varied, each of the
insurers contended that its pollution exclusion negated any duty to de-
fend Dingwell against the class action. 24 The court disagreed, holding
that each insurer had a duty to defend."25
While it did not clearly define the meaning of "sudden and acci-
dental" under Maine law, the court did hold that the phrase "expected
and intended" was not interchangeable with "sudden and acciden-
1987); Technicon Elect. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 542 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 1989);
Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986).
122. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit in deciding a case under Georgia law in which coverage
turned on the "sudden and accidental" issue, certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court.
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 865 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1989). Perhaps that action will
spark a judicial trend, encouraging federal courts to obtain definitive rulings from the highest
court of the applicable state before adjudicating the coverage claim. Such an approach would cer-
tainly impose more consistency on judicial interpretations within a state than exists currently.
123. 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980).
124. Id. at 223.
125. Id.
[Vol. 45:161
POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE
tal."''2 The court, however, based the duty to defend on the fact that
the insurers had not alleged sufficient facts to determine that the occur-
rence fell under the pollution exclusion. The Maine Supreme Court
found that the pollution exclusion focuses on the initial release of pollu-
tants, while the complaint at issue focused on the damage subsequent
to release.127 The court viewed the post-release migration of the pollu-
tants as irrelevant to the scope of the exclusion.128 In order to exempt
themselves from defending Dingwell against the class action, the insur-
ers had to show that the initial release of pollutants had not been sud-
den and accidental. 129 In the court's view, the characterization of the
release of the pollutants was critical to trigger the coverage exclusion.
2. Iowa: Weber v. IMT Insurance Co.130
While the Iowa Supreme Court did not address the meaning of
"sudden" in the 1990 Weber case, it did define "accidental," and held
the entire pollution exclusion applicable to odors from waste material
that damaged another's property. 131 Newman, a sweet corn farmer and
neighbor to Weber, alleged extensive damage to his crop due to the
odor from consistent spillage of hog manure that Weber transported
between fields. For several years, Weber had hauled hog manure from
one area of his farm to another utilizing a common roadway between
Newman's farm and his own. Weber used a manure spreader to trans-
port the material. 3 2 This method of transportation consistently led to
spillage, and the odor from the spilled manure adversely affected New-
man's sweet corn crop. Predictably, Weber's insurer refused to defend
him in the litigation, denying coverage due to the pollution exclusion
clause in Weber's farm liability policy.
The court considered the spillage to be waste material under the
exclusionary language, raising the issue of whether the discharge of the
material was "sudden and accidental." Because the phrase "sudden and
126. The court noted that a release of pollutants "may be unexpected and unintended, with-
out being sudden and accidental." Id.
127. Id. at 225.
128. Id. The court specifically noted that the lower court in ruling upon this case had failed:
to distinguish between the gradual permeation of the ground, by which the water table was
ultimately polluted, and the initial release of the pollutants from Dingwell's facility. The class
action plaintiffs, at this point, have no way of knowing how the toxic wastes entered the
ground. There may have been either intentional dumping or burial or unintentional spills,
leaks, or other accidents.
Id. at 224-25.
129. Id.
130. 462 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1990).
131. Id. at 286.
132. A manure spreader systematically drops manure and then tracks over it to spread the
manure on the ground as fertilizer. Id. at 287.
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accidental" is conjunctive, the court determined that a release must be
both sudden and accidental to restore coverage under the exclusion.'33
The court acknowledged the diversity of meanings of the word "sud-
den," but studiously avoided judicial interpretation of the word itself.13 4
Instead, the court held that the exception to the pollution exclusion was
not satisfied since the release was not accidental. 13 5 The court examined
other jurisdictions' interpretations of "accidental" before adopting one
that comported with both Iowa precedent and persuasive extrajurisdic-
tional decisions.136 Thus, the court held "accidental," as used in the pol-
icy exclusion, to mean an unexpected and unintended event. 13 7
The evidence presented to the court showed a several year history
of manure spillage during transport. In the court's view, Weber should
have expected such spills-the operation of a manure spreader and ha-
bitual spillage over a lengthy period of time were enough to alert Weber
to both the possibility of damage and its likely occurrence. 38 This fore-
seeability negated a determination that the event was accidental. Be-
cause the release did not fulfill the accidental prong of the exclusionary
clause, the court declined to define "sudden."' 3 9 In Iowa at least, a con-
taminating release must be both "accidental" and "sudden" to reinstate
coverage for damage created by pollution.
From this decision, it seems that the Iowa Supreme Court may give
"sudden" a temporal meaning. The court did not view "accidental" as
simply mirroring the coverage under "occurrence." Thus, it might be
inferred that the court would follow the line of cases that have refused
to find that the "occurrence" requirement and the "sudden and acci-
dental" language are coextensive. 140 To avoid redundancy in the policy
language, the court might define a "sudden" release temporally.
3. New York: Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home
Assurance Co.'4' and Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Insurance
Co.142
In 1989 Technicon provided the highest court of New York with a
relatively uncomplicated set of facts with which to confront the pollu-
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. The court examined both prior cases in which it had defined "accident" and Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals cases defining "accidental" and "expected." Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See infra part IH.B.4.
141. 542 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 1989).
142. 548 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y. 1989).
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tion exclusion. Technicon operated a blood sample analysis machine
manufacturing plant in Puerto Rico that intentionally discharged toxic
chemicals, including heavy metals such as mercury, into a nearby
creek.1 43 Residents of an adjacent area sued Technicon for personal in-
juries allegedly caused by exposure to the pollutants. Soon after the suit
was filed, the EPA warned Technicon that the agency was considering
the imposition of CERCLA charges.1 4
4
In its answers to interrogatories in connection with the pending lit-
igation, Technicon admitted that the discharges were intentional, but
claimed they were lawful. Technicon's insurers refused to defend the
claims, alleging noncoverage under the CGL's pollution exclusion.
Technicon then brought a declaratory judgment action against seven-
teen of its insurers to ascertain their legal obligations to the
company.145
While the court found that such damages fit under the "occur-
rence" language of the policy, since the damages were unintended and
unexpected, it held that the pollution exclusion negated that cover-
age.1" The court described the exclusion as "unambiguously plain and
operative," and it specifically held that the exception modified the "oc-
currence" coverage by narrowing the kinds of events for which coverage
legitimately is applied. 147 The court then found that an intentional dis-
charge of pollutants into the waterway could not be construed as an
"accidental" release under the exception to the exclusion. 48
Using the same construction as the Iowa court in Weber, the Court
of Appeals for New York noted the conjunctive requirement of the ex-
ception. A release must be both sudden and accidental to reinstate cov-
erage otherwise negated by the exclusion. 4 9 Because Technicon
intended to discharge waste material, the exception to the exclusion
clause remained unactivated. Having decided that Technicon's claim
for coverage failed the "accidental" prong of the reinstatement test, the
court refused to consider the interpretation of "sudden."' 50 Since the
court specifically held that the exclusionary language was not cotermi-
nous with the "occurrence" language, the court appears to be inclined
in future litigation to impart some temporal aspect to the meaning of
"sudden."
143. 542 N.E.2d at 1049.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1050.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1050-51.
149. "[D]ischarges that are either nonsudden or nonaccidental block the exception from nul-
lifying the pollution exclusion." Id. at 1050.
150. Id. at 1051.
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In Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.151 the court reaf-
firmed its holding in Technicon that intentional discharges of contami-
nants do not satisfy the "sudden and accidental" clause. When the
previous owner of the property released the pollutants without the
knowledge of the current owner-the insured-the pollution exclusion
nonetheless excluded coverage of the second owner for damages related
to the earlier disposal.152 The scope of the pollution exclusion under
New York law thus is not limited to liability based on actions of the
insured, and the landowner may be liable for damages from intentional
releases by a previous owner.15 3
4. North Carolina: Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless
Insurance Co.15 4
In 1986 the Supreme Court of North Carolina interpreted the pol-
lution exclusion clause in Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v.
Peerless Insurance Co. This decision was a major step away from the
decisions in both Lansco and Dingwell.155
In Waste Management the EPA alleged that a landfill owned by
Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc., had leached dangerous chemicals
into groundwater, rendering the well water for the surrounding commu-
nity hazardous for human consumption. Waste Management impleaded
Trash Removal Systems, Inc. (TRS), the transporter of waste to the
landfill, alleging that TRS had represented the waste to be nonhazard-
ous. The TRS insurers denied any duty to defend the company under
the policy since the policy contained a pollution exclusion. TRS
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the duties of its
insurers under the policy.
The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to find the exclusion
ambiguous. 56 The court expressly criticized the Dingwell decision as
too restrictive. 5" The court instead utilized a tripartite analysis, at-
151. 548 N.E.2d 1301 (1989).
152. Id. at 1302.
153. The court rejected Powers Chemco's argument that:
since it was not the actual polluter, but merely inherited the problem from the prior land-
owner, the pollution exclusion clause cannot bar its present insurance claim, and that there is
nothing in the language. . . to suggest that it is not applicable when liability is premised on
the conduct of someone other than the insured.
Id.
154. 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C.), reh'g denied, 346 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1986).
155. See supra parts II.B.2.b, IH.B.1.
156. 340 S.E.2d at 379.
157. Id. at 381 (stating that when "[c]ourts consider the release alone to be the key to the
pollution exclusion clause, the sudden and accidental exception can be bootstrapped onto almost
any allegations that do not specify a gradual release or emission"). The Peerless court required a
broader analysis in order to give meaning to all of the policy language.
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tempting to read separate meaning into "occurrence," the pollution ex-
clusion, and the "sudden and accidental" exception to the exclusion.
First, the court found that the "occurrence" requirement focuses on the
anticipation of the insured as to the damages sustained.'58 Unexpected
and unintended damages satisfy this occurrence requirement. Next, the
court found that the body of the pollution exclusion requires that the
occurrence actually result in contamination. 159 Finally, the court in-
ferred a temporal aspect to the "sudden and accidental" phrase, hold-
ing that the phrase means both instantaneous and unexpected. 60
By refusing to follow Lansco's holding that the exclusionary clause
reiterates the "occurrence" language, the North Carolina Supreme
Court gave meaning to each requisite word and phrase in the policy.
The court noted that to hold otherwise would render the policy provi-
sions redundant and indistinguishable from one another, an unwanted
result for insurance policies in which each word is drafted carefully for
coverage purposes. 161 Thus, according to the North Carolina Supreme
Court, a pollution event's damage coverage is not reinstated under-the
exception unless the release was "sudden and accidental," that is, in-
stantaneous and unexpected.
Waste Management is significant for its recognition that the pollu-
tion exclusion limits the coverage available under the initial "occur-
rence" language. Under the Waste Management court's analysis, the
gradual leaching of hazardous materials does not meet the temporal re-
quirements of the language of the exclusion.6 2
5. Massachusetts: Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville
Industries, Inc.'6"
Unlike the Iowa court's decision in Weber, the Massachusetts court
in Lumbermens clearly defined "sudden" as containing a temporal ele-
ment. In the 1970s Belleville Industries produced electrical capacitors
using polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in its manufacturing process.
In the district court action, both state and federal governments alleged
that PCBs from Belleville's plant had polluted the New Bedford Har-
bor. Citing the pollution exclusion, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty re-
fused to defend Belleville in the ensuing litigation. Belleville, however,
158. Id. at 382.
159. Id. at 380-81.
160. Id. at 382 (stating that "[t]he exception also describes the event-not only in terms of
its being unexpected, but in terms of its happening instantaneously or precipitantly").
161. Id. at 381-82. In the course of determining the proper interpretation of the language, the
court also discussed the public policy purposes underlying the exclusion. Id. at 381.
162. Id. at 383.
163. 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990).
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argued that the release of pollutants was "sudden and accidental" and
thus covered by its CGL policy.164
Prior to Lumbermens, Massachusetts courts had interpreted the
"sudden and accidental" clause in conflicting manners. In Shapiro v.
Public Service Mutual Insurance Co.'165 the court found the exception
ambiguous and allowed coverage for gradual pollution. In C.L.
Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance Co.,166 how-
ever, the court refused to follow Shapiro's reasoning and questioned
whether the state supreme court likewise would decline to follow the
Shapiro court's rationale.1 6 7
In Lumbermens the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court'68 re-
fused to find that the "sudden and accidental" clause was ambiguous,
or that it merely echoed the "occurrence" language. The court stressed
that policy language should not be interpreted to promote surplusage.6 9
Instead, the court noted that the term "occurrence" focuses inquiry on
whether the damage was expected or intended from the insured's point
of view, while coverage under the exception turns on whether the re-
lease of the pollutants happened suddenly. 7 The court stressed the
importance of the release itself, holding that the "sudden and acciden-
tal" phrase concerns neither the cause of the release of a pollutant nor
the damage resulting from the release.'
The court held that "sudden," when used in conjunction with "ac-
cidental," is unambiguous and has a crucial temporal element requiring
an abrupt release. 72 Finding no reasonable alternative to the construc-
tion given "sudden" in the context of the exclusion, the court summa-
rily rejected the prior cases that found ambiguity in the term. 173 The
court, however, injected some uncertainty into its otherwise clear opin-
ion by noting that it left undecided the extent to which the drafting
history of a phrase in a standard form policy would resolve interpretive
164. Id. at 570.
165. 477 N.E.2d 146 (Mass. Ct. App. 1985); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Quinn Constr. Co.,
713 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1989) (accepting, in dicta, the Shapiro holding).
166. 712 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1989).
167. Lumbermens, 555 N.E.2d at 571.
168. Lumbermens was before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on certification
from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. This certification allowed
the state supreme court to rule on the insurance issues presented, thereby giving guidance to the
federal court and promoting consistency of judicial interpretation under Massachusetts law.
169. Lumbermens, 555 N.E.2d at 572.
170. Id. at 570.
171. Id. at 571.
172. "If the word 'sudden' is to have any meaning or value in the exception to the pollution
exclusion clause, only an abrupt discharge or release of pollutants falls within the exception." Id.
at 572.
173. Id. at 573.
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disputes over policy language." 4 Thus, for the time being, litigants in
Massachusetts should consider carefully the import of conflicting draft-
ing histories. 17 5
6. Wisconsin: Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd. 17 1
Just months before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court de-
cided Lumbermens, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached the opposite
conclusion, holding that the "sudden and accidental" language in the
CGL is ambiguous. 17 A comparison between Lumbermens and Just
points out the variations on pollution exclusion interpretations.
Land Reclamation, Ltd. (LRL) operated a landfill in Racine
County, Wisconsin. Nearby landowners brought suit against LRL, alleg-
ing that over the course of time, the company had operated the site
negligently. The landowners complained that LRL operated the landfill
in violation of federal, state, and local laws and that LRL's actions re-
sulted in water contamination, noise, dust, odor, blowing trash, pest in-
festation, and an increase in medical abnormalities among nearby
residents. 178 Bituminous, LRL's insurer, conceded that the pollution
was an "occurrence" under the liability policy, but refused to defend
LRL, alleging that LRL's actions did not satisfy the "sudden and acci-
dental" exception to the pollution exclusion.
While both the trial and appeals courts found that the meaning of
the "sudden and accidental" phrase was plain, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court disagreed, finding the term "sudden" to be ambiguous. 7 9 Al-
though it agreed with the lower courts that "sudden and accidental"
could mean abrupt or immediate, the court held that a phrase is ambig-
uous when it is susceptible to more than one interpretation and quoted
different meanings given to the word "sudden" in two different diction-
aries.1 0 To the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the fact that two dictionaries
differed on the primary definition of "sudden" showed that the term is
ambiguous.' 8 1
The court's finding of ambiguity led it to construe the policy ac-
cording to the doctrine of contra preferentem.'82 The court thus con-
strued "sudden and accidental" against the insurer by finding that it
174. Id.
175. See supra part II.B.2.a.
176. 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
177. Id. at 573.
178. Id. at 572.
179. Id. at 571.
180. Id. at 573.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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means "unexpected and unintended. ' 1 3 The court noted that this in-
terpretation comports with the particular drafting history that consid-
ers the phrase to restate the coverage available under "occurrence.'
8 4
The dissent disagreed with the finding of ambiguity,8 5 stating that
"sudden," when viewed in the context of the exception, necessarily
must have a temporal meaning. 8 6 According to the dissent, to construe
"sudden" as "unexpected and unintended" strips it of any discernible
meaning distinct from that of its conjunctive term "accidental.' ' 8 7 To
the dissent, the majority's interpretation strained the language and led
to useless surplusage.
s8
7. Georgia: Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.'89
Henry Claussen owned a fifty-two acre tract of land that he leased
out as a municipal landfill. For six years the site was used almost exclu-
sively for chemical and industrial waste. In 1977 the site was closed and
returned to Claussen with the fill completely graded and seeded. In
1985 the EPA ranked the site as one of the most hazardous in the na-
tion. 90 The leaching of hazardous materials from the former landfill
had contaminated the groundwater. When confronted with a suit
brought by the EPA, Claussen claimed that he had had no knowledge
of hazardous waste dumping at the site.'9 '
Claiming that the pollution exclusion negated coverage, Claussen's
insurer, Aetna, refused to defend him against the EPA action. The ac-
tion was removed to the District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia, which gave summary judgment to Aetna. 92 On appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit, the court certified the policy interpretation issues to
the Georgia Supreme Court.
193
In the Georgia Supreme Court, Aetna argued that "sudden" could
only mean "abrupt," while Claussen argued that it meant "unex-
pected."'1 4 The court consulted four dictionaries and found that "sud-
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 579 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 579-80. The dissent wondered why the policy would reinstate coverage for "unex-
pected and unintended" releases. Id.
188. Id. "The term 'sudden,' read in context, adds nothing and is therefore meaningless un-
less its plain meaning is construed to add the element of brevity, the temporal element, to the
characterization of the polluting discharge." Id. at 580.
189. 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989).
190. Id. at 687.
191. Id.
192. 676 F. Supp. 1571 (1987).
193. 865 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1989).
194. Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688.
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den" has several reasonable meanings. 195 The court began its decision
by stating that Georgia contract interpretation law requires words to
bear their common meanings. 96 If the common meaning is "doubtful"
then the courts will construe the term so as to provide coverage.19 7
Since "sudden" could have any one of several meanings, the court held
that the definition proposed by the insured-unexpected-should be
used.9 "
Faced with this adverse determination, Aetna then argued that
such a construction would violate another basic interpretive rule, that
contracts should be read to give each word separate meaning."'s Aetna
argued that interpreting the term "sudden" to mean "unexpected"
would merely restate the meaning and coverage of "occurrence. 2 00 The
court disagreed and held that the pollution exclusion focuses on
whether the release of pollutants is unexpected, whereas the "occur-
rence" definition focuses on whether the damage is unexpected.20'
Having failed with its other arguments, Aetna then proposed that
public policy mandates a different construction of "sudden." The in-
surer stated that the use of the "unexpected" interpretation gives a pol-
icyholder an incentive to remain unaware of how his land is being
used.202 The court acknowledged the persuasiveness of this reasoning,
but thought the point moot.203 Because the absolute pollution exclusion
replaced the old pollution exclusion clause in 1985, the court believed
that its decision would have little impact on the future behavior of
insureds.04
195. "Thus, if an insurance contract is capable of being construed two ways, it will be con-
strued against the insurance company and in favor of the insured." Id.
196. Id. at 687-88. The court stated that perhaps the temporal meaning of "sudden":
is so common in the vernacular that it is, indeed, difficult to think of "sudden" without a
temporal connotation: a sudden flash, a sudden burst of speed, a sudden bang. But, on reflec-
tion one realizes that, even in its popular usage, "sudden" does not usually describe the dura-
tion of an event, but rather its unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in the road,
sudden death. Even when used to describe the onset of an event, the word has an elastic
temporal connotation that varies with expectations: Suddenly, it's spring.
Id. at 688.
197. Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(5) (Michie 1982)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. Thus, the court held that the exclusion has only the effect of negating coverage for
intentional discharge leading to damage.
202. Id. at 689. To follow Aetna's argument to its logical conclusion, as long as a landowner
does not know how his land is being used, he cannot expect any release of pollutants. Thus, as long
as he remains unaware---"keeps his head in the sand"-a landowner will always have liability cov-
erage under the "sudden and accidental" exception to the exclusion.
203. Id. at 689-90.
204. Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 690. On remand, the district court held that the Georgia Su-
preme Court assumed the validity of a true "head in the sand" defense. Claussen v. Aetna Casu-
1991]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Three Justices dissented from the opinion, preferring to find the
exclusion unambiguous.0 5 While they agreed that "sudden" does have
different meanings in different contexts, they thought that it could only
mean "abrupt" in the particular context at issue.20 The dissenters did
not believe that the policy language could be construed to allow cover-
age for six years of toxic waste dumping as an established business
procedure.20
8. Colorado: Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co. 20 8
From 1938 to 1953 the Hecla Mining Company discharged slag
materials into a drainage tunnel. These materials eventually filled the
tunnel and blocked the normal flow of water through it. In the early
1980s the blockage was expelled by a surge of water when the water
pressure behind the blockage grew too high. This surge carried the min-
ing waste down into the California Gulch drainage basin system, con-
taminating the water and turning a twenty-mile segment of the
Arkansas River orange. The State of Colorado initiated a CERCLA
claim against Hecla, seeking joint and several liability for the expense
of decontaminating the polluted area.20 9
Hecla's insurers refused to defend it under its CGL policy, alleging
that the discharge had occurred over a period of years and thus was not
sudden and accidental. Following the Claussen court's reasoning and
quoting extensively from the Claussen decision, the Colorado Supreme
Court ruled that the term "sudden" is susceptible to several definitions,
thus making it ambiguous. 10 This ambiguity allowed the court to rule
against the insurer by construing the phrase "sudden and accidental" as
equivalent to "unexpected and unintended. '211
The court believed that it could not imbue "sudden and acciden-
tal" with purely temporal meaning because to do so would be inconsis-
tent with the given definition of "occurrence. ' 212 The court stated that
the occurrence language covered unexpected and unintended, continu-
alty & Surety Co., 754 F. Supp. 1576, 1582 (S.D. Ga. 1990). The court rejected the Powers Chemco
rationale and found that only the insured's intent to release pollutants is pertinent to coverage, not
a third party's expectations. Id.
205. Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 690 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
209. Id. at 1085.
210. Id. at 1092 n.13. While the existence of conflicting authority alone is not sufficient to
establish that an insurance policy term is ambiguous, the Colorado court maintained that it does
cast doubt on the insurer's insistence that the policy language is clear and unambiguous. Id. at
1092.
211. Id. at 1092.
212. Id.
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ous and repeated exposure to harmful conditions created by the in-
sured.213 None of the complaints at issue alleged that Hecla had
expected or intended the discharge of pollutants into the California
Gulch, so the Colorado Supreme Court aligned itself with the Georgia
Supreme Court's decision in Claussen21 4 and held that Hecla's insurers
had a duty to defend under the issued CGL policy.
9. California and Washington: Two States Anticipating
Interpretation
While the California Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a particu-
lar construction of the pollution exclusion, it has laid the groundwork
for such a decision. In AIU Insurance Co. v. FMC Corp.21 5 the court
interpreted the main CGL coverage language, expressly reserving the
proper construction of the pollution exclusion.1 6 Under California law,
the court held that undefined terms in the body of the exclusion should
be given their plain and ordinary meanings, and that any ambiguities in
the language should be resolved in favor of coverage. 217 Thus, a proin-
sured pollution exclusion decision seems likely in California.
In a similar case, Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,218
the Washington Supreme Court ruled that each phrase in an insurance
policy must be construed in context to give effect to each word or
clause.219 Undefined terms must be given their plain, ordinary, and pop-
ular meanings, to be ascertained from standard dictionaries. 220 The
court refused to give a term a legal or technical meaning unless it is
clear that both parties intended something other than the common defi-
nition.221 Furthermore, the court declined to apply a different interpre-
tive rule simply because the insured was a large corporate entity and
not an individual.222
213. Id.
214. See supra part llI.B.7.
215. 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990).
216. At issue in AU Insurance was whether costs incurred under CERCLA for mandatory
injunctive relief and cleanup are considered "damages" under the CGL and thus are covered under
the policy.
217. Id. at 1264-65.
218. 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990).
219. Id. at 511.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 513.
222. Because CGL policies are standardized, the court's ruling binds each insured and in-
surer to the court's interpretation regardless of the size of the insured's business or its expertise in
negotiating insurance coverage. Id. at 514.
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IV. WRESTLING WITH THE INTERPRETIVE DIFFERENCES
There appears to be no easy way to reconcile judicial interpreta-
tions of the pollution exclusion.2 s Implementing any kind of consis-
tency and predictability for future cases arising under the exclusion
seems to be a dim hope because "sudden and accidental" is undefined
and uncertain. The usual judicial tools of interpretation are not helpful
in resolving coverage disputes under the pollution exclusion. Most nota-
bly, the drafting history behind the provision points to no definitive
interpretation because the intent of the ISO in drafting the provision is
fuzzy at best. With the shadow of CERCLA falling across polluted sites,
courts may feel pressured to produce result-oriented decisions, and with
costs of pollution cleanup running high, courts may seek to impose lia-
bility upon a party simply to ensure that someone ameliorates a hazard-
ous situation.
Finally, courts must consider the financial viability of both in-
sureds and insurers. In formulating any resolution to the interpretive
problems of the CGL pollution exclusion, courts must be sensitive not
only to the present viability of businesses but also to the future liabili-
ties that undoubtedly will arise. While the short-term goal of litigation
in this area is to resolve liability for cleanup of a presently known pol-
luted site, the precedential effect of these coverage cases will determine
how industrial pollution damage will be handled in the distant future.
While the confusing strands of the pollution exclusion are difficult
to untangle, numerous scholars and commentators have attempted to
provide better, more efficient methods of resolution than litigation.224 It
is obvious from the state supreme court decisions that the litigation in
this area is time-consuming and does nothing to promote a consistent
national policy for cleanup of hazardous sites.
At least one of these courts seems almost deliberately obtuse about
the future ramifications of its decision. 225 The Georgia Supreme Court's
decision in Claussen226 exhibits blatant shortsightedness. The Claussen
223. One scholar believes that the insurance companies rejected the pollution exclusion too
soon. Asserting that a proinsurer trend began in 1987, this scholar believes that the ISO adopted
the absolute pollution exclusion just as courts were beginning to give the old exclusion its proper
effect. Comment, supra note 3. This seems to indicate that the judicial trend was pointing strongly
toward narrow interpretations of coverage under the exclusion. However, there is no evidence to
support such a clear proinsurer trend. Instead, the ISO appears to have eliminated the pollution
exclusion wisely, preferring instead to cover only individualized pollution risks with riders and not
in the form policy. Under this approach insurers can exercise greater control over what kinds of
pollution risks they are willing to underwrite.
224. See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
225. In contrast, the New Jersey courts have used result-oriented decisionmaking with the
seeming intent of attracting new industry to the state. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
226. Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989); see supra part III.B.7.
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court believed that its "sudden and accidental" interpretation would
have few repercussions because CGL policies no longer include the
phrase.227 Because an absolute pollution exclusion is now used in CGL
policies,22 the court apparently thought the scope and effect of its deci-
sion would be limited. However, policies containing the pollution exclu-
sion, in use from 1970 to 1985, will remain actionable for many years to
come. Because pollution damage may not even be discovered for years,
the policies containing the exclusion-those in use when the release of
pollutants occurred-will determine future cleanup liability. The
Claussen decision may provide an incentive to landowners to take a
"head in the sand" approach, by seldom checking on the use of their
land. As long as the pollution exclusion is litigated, there will be an
incentive to make such an argument.
If litigation is not promoting consistency and predictability in
ascribing liability for cleaning up polluted sites, what method will de-
termine liability in a more workable fashion? Commentators have ex-
pressed a wide variety of viewpoints. They have tried to promote
particular drafting histories,229 legislative change,230 and new methods
of arriving at the efficient amount of resources to be allocated by both
insurers and insureds to clean up a contaminated site.2 31 Viewpoints
run the gamut from hopeful resolutions to tangled ideas of fortuitous,
result-oriented decisionmaking.232
One commentator has suggested a model in which, by fixing pre-
cisely the focus of a policy,233 and by defining exactly three parameters,
activeness, directness, and suddenness, every contaminating activity
could be categorized for coverage assessment.23 4 Unfortunately, defining
policy terms with pinpoint accuracy is the exact difficulty with the pol-
lution exclusion. Attempting to place pollution events into distinct cate-
227. 380 S.E.2d at 689-90.
228. One scholar claims that the absolute pollution exclusion inserted into CGL policies in
1985 demonstrates the ISO's ability to exclude virtually all pollution coverage claims. Jackson,
supra note 3, at 224 (stating that "when the insurers wanted to [exclude coverage], they knew how
to do it"). But this view is not necessarily accurate. In drafting the old pollution exclusion, the ISO
might have drafted the most effective language at the time, not realizing that intense pressure to
fund cleanups would force courts to strain their interpretive skills. Moreover, the absolute pollu-
tion exclusion has not been in existence long enough to demonstrate how airtight its language is
when subjected to the scrutiny of litigation. For an analysis of potential ambiguities under the
absolute pollution exclusion, see Comment, supra note 3.
229. See generally Greenlaw, Note, supra note 3,; Ballard & Manus, supra note 1, at 620-29.
230. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
231. See infra notes 233-34, 237-38 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 77 (proposing various methods of cooperation between
insurers and inureds, and concluding in an optimistic tone); Note, supra note 47 (taking a proin-
surer stance and designing an interpretational framework to effectuate that perspective).
233. Note, supra note 47, at 1241.
234. Id. at 1281.
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gories by using narrow definitional parameters seems likely to create
only more confusion in this area.
Mitchell Lathrop believes that a first step in resolving coverage
under the exclusion is to modify the heavy burden of CERCLA.25 He
states that only federal legislation can spread the monumental costs of
cleanups more equitably throughout the national economy.238 The strict
liability nature of the statute sets the stage for aggressive and tenacious
lawsuits. The staggering amounts of money involved under CERCLA
may make litigating coverage a necessity under some circumstances. By
moderating the scope of CERCLA, some of the incentives to litigate
coverage disputes might disappear. While Lathrop's proposal would not
aid in resolving the interpretive problems of the CGL policy language,
at least it might eliminate some of the disputes arising under that
language.
Another commentator has noted some governmental and industrial
interest in establishing a fund from which to pay costs of environmental
remediation .237 There are several different funding schemes currently
being circulated for comment in the environmental liability field, the
most viable of which would require a mandatory two percent surcharge
on both premiums paid by insureds and on the coverage provided by
insurance companies.23 s This proposal has several weaknesses common
to all fund schemes. The transaction costs associated with an environ-
mental cleanup fund can be staggering. Administering the fund, collect-
ing the surcharges, validating payouts, and organizing cleanups all raise
the overhead involved in putting together a cleanup pool. Moreover,
most common pool funding programs provide only attenuated incen-
tives not to pollute, unlike the strong disincentives provided when indi-
vidual liability is at stake. Finally, with the exorbitant costs of pollution
cleanup and the de facto strict liability scheme of CERCLA, a fund
may be depleted quickly.
Attorneys Ballard and Manus"" agree with the holding in Claus-
sen.240 They view the pollution exclusion as limiting only coverage for
unanticipated or unintended pollution discharges.24' Unfortunately,
these commentators put far too much emphasis on the inability of
courts to discern how short the duration of the pollution release was in
235. LONG, supra note 15, § 10A.04.
236. Id.
237. Michael C. Pruett, Note, Environmental Cleanup Costs and Insurance: Seeking a Solu-
tion, 24 GA. L. REV. 705 (1990).
238. Id. at 723. In other words, both insureds and insurers would pay into a fund based on
the total amount of pollution liability provided.
239. Ballard & Manus, supra note 1.
240. Id. at 643; see supra part II.B.7 (discussing Claussen).
241. Ballard & Manus, supra note 1, at 643.
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order to see if that release qualifies for coverage under the "sudden and
accidental" exception to the exclusion. Durational limits may be better
served by focusing instead on foreseeability and ordinary business
processes. An industry that pollutes as part of its manufacturing pro-
cess should not be able to claim coverage, while one that experiences an
equipment malfunction resulting in a release of pollutants should. It is
the middle ground between the two scenarios that is difficult to fit
under the language of the exception.
Perhaps there is no way to reconcile all of the contradictory factors
at work in coverage under the pollution exclusion. As one commentator
points out, as long as both sides continue to adhere to the hard line,
neither side has any incentive to compromise. 42 The coverage claim
might as well be litigated if neither side is willing to concede some
amount of liability. If coverage is limited to instantaneous calamities, 243
as insurers like to argue, then almost no pollution damages will be cov-
ered under the policy and businesses lose little by litigating their
claims. CGL insurance was not meant to cover risks associated with
everyday business processes that cause pollution whether or not the
business knew that such processes would cause environmental dam-
age.2 " By refusing to cover ordinary business operations, insurers create
an incentive for industry to investigate the environmental results of its
manufacturing processes. Extending coverage to grant indemnity under
those circumstances would dissipate any such incentive. 45
Arbitration and mediation are two relatively unexplored avenues of
resolution in this area.246 The mechanics of these approaches, however,
may not be well-suited to resolving the multitude of coverage claims
that currently exist or that will arise in the future. Most proposed
forms of arbitration or mediation, would resolve disputes on a case-by-
case basis. 247 Due to the large number of these disputes, however, trans-
action costs again would escalate. Moreover, knowledgeable mediation
experts and arbitration panels set up to deal with these claims would be
besieged with parties seeking resolution. A backlog 6f claims could re-
242. Jackson, supra note 77, at 769.
243. Id.
244. Comprehensive general liability insurance was designed originally to cover unantici-
pated damage to third parties, not to cover injuries resulting from industrial practices whose
harmfulness was highly likely. See supra notes 6-9 & 30 and accompanying text.
245. But see Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, the Standard-Form
Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia, 21 ENvrL.
L. 357 (1991) (stating that insurers should be held accountable for all policy language). The article,
however, does not discuss the accountability of polluting companies or the need to provide incen-
tives to clean up the environment.
246. See Note, supra note 237.
247. Id.
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sult in a delay in environmental remediation, perhaps leading to irrepa-
rable environmental and public health damage.
While carefully planning the framework within which such alter-
nate resolution would take place may overcome some of these concerns,
others remain. The greatest weakness of such case-by-case resolution is
that it does little to promote predictability and consistency. Much like
the fact-specific rulings occurring in judicial resolution of pollution ex-
clusion questions, alternative means of resolution provide neither insur-
ers nor insureds with certainty about whether coverage will or will not
be afforded under a certain set of facts.
Certainly any nonlitigation approach to resolving these difficult
coverage claims must provide for some cost sharing between insurers
and insureds.248 Neither party can foot the bill for an entire cleanup
and neither party should be required to do so. With the intent of insur-
ers as to the "sudden and accidental" exception to the exclusion
shrouded in impenetrable conflicting drafting history, and with CER-
CLA and a growing public movement creating disincentives for indus-
trial pollution, it is equitable to make each party pay some amount to
clean up pollution damage. Individual negotiation between insurers and
insureds, however, may not be desirable due to judicial precedent and
the acrimonious history of their relationship in dealing with coverage in
this area.
Perhaps the most equitable solution would be to make insurers and
insureds split the cost of environmental remediation equally. While it
may sound simplistic, such a solution would be easily workable with few
transaction costs, would still provide an incentive for industry to de-
velop clean, safe manufacturing processes, and would force insurers to
allow some coverage under the CGL policies. Moreover, this approach
would provide the maximum amount of predictability. It could make
the inefficient and costly litigation over coverage obsolete and make
each party shoulder a fair share of the liability for pollution damages.
Recognizing that the ends of the liability spectrum are untenable
may promote greater cooperation between insureds and insurers. In the
face of rampant forum shopping, interpretive uncertainties, and poten-
tially deleterious costs of cleanup, some kind of alternative dispute res-
olution or cost sharing may be the only way to resolve the inequities
that abound in this area of the law.
V. CONCLUSION
The pollution exclusion is a confusing amalgam of contradictory
drafting histories, public policy concerns, business incentives, and unde-
248. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 243.
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fined terms. While the exclusion has not been in use since 1985, the
language of the pollution exclusion will continue to be litigated since
many pollution events caused injury when the exclusion was still in ef-
fect. Discovering contamination takes time, making pollution liability a
long-tailed risk. As a result, interpretations of the exclusion will affect
litigants far into the future.
Not only do these judicial interpretations influence potential liti-
gants, but they also determine the availability of pollution coverage and
provide both incentives and disincentives to clean up hazardous waste.
Currently, there is no middle ground for liability. Some solution must
be imposed to right the inequities of the situation. While neither policy-
holders nor insurers foresaw the tremendous liabilities associated with
CERCLA, judicial interpretations of CGL policies still are extending
coverage for the astronomical damages associated with that statute.
Bankrupting businesses to pay for cleanup is not the answer, but
neither is bankrupting insurers or forcing the cost of pollution riders so
high as to make any written coverage virtually nonexistent.
The answer to the interpretive problem is not contained in the
murky drafting history of the exclusion. Moreover, to search standard
dictionaries to define the meanings of key policy terms seems to yield
whatever results a court sets out to find. Thus, cooperation is needed to
break the uncertainty under which CGL pollution coverage is inter-
preted. Society should be able to live in a nonhazardous environment.
How to achieve the proper balance of incentives to promote cleaner,
less harmful industrial processes, and a reasonable amount of indem-
nity by the insurers in underwriting risk, is the seemingly unsolvable
problem. The Gordian Knot is awaiting Alexander's sword.
Sharon M. Murphy
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